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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

;

v.

:

DON JACOB SETOKI,

;

Defendant/Appellant,

Case No. 20080930-CA

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, presiding. The Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(c) (2008),
whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court
of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree or capital felony. Mr.
Sctoki was convicted of illegal possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(l), and illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code section 58-37a-5. He is
not incarcerated.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the State Provided Sufficient Evidence to Convict Mr. Sctoki of
Illegal Possession of a Controlled Substance.

Preservation: This issue was preserved when defense counsel moved for a
directed verdict on the basis that the State failed to establish a prima facie case that Mr.
Sctoki possessed or used a controlled substance. Defense counsel specifically argued for
a directed verdict on the basis that the controlled substance was not retested. the State had
not fingerprinted the incriminating evidence, the incriminating statements Mr. Sctoki
allegedly made were not recorded, and there was no contact with the registered owner of
the vehicle. See R. 150:90. To be cautious, however, this court can also review this
issue for plain error.
Standard of Review: When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, the court of appeals views '"the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^J 18,
70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. Krugcr, 2000 UT 60, U 2, 6 P.3d 1116). Under this view,
the court of appeals will '"reverse a jury verdict only when the evidence . . . is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was
convicted.'" Id. (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). "fT]o
establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient
to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency was so
obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury."
State v. Holgatc, 2000 U 1 74,1| 17, 10 P.3d 346.

2

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2007);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2007).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 14, 2007, Mr. Sctoki was charged with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 58-378(2)(a)(i), and unlawful possession of a drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code section 58-37a-5. See R. 7-8. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-378(2)(a)(i) (2007); 58-37a-5 (2007). A jury trial was held on July 35 2008. See R. 83. At
the close of the State's case and after Mr. Setoki's father testified, defense counsel moved
for a directed verdict on the basis that the State had failed to present sufficient evidence
to sustain a conviction for either charge. See R. 150:90. The court denied the motion,
and defense counsel then rested its case. See R. 150:90. The court submitted the case to
the jury, which found Mr. Sctoki guilty of both of the charged offenses. See R. 86. Mr.
Setoki appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the evening hours of May 5, 2007, Officer Christopher Dowland spotted a
gold colored Acura traveling northbound on Bangertcr Highway. R. 150:37. Officer
Dowland paced the vehicle with his speedometer and estimated that it was traveling
approximately seventy to seventy-five miles per hour. R. 150:37. lie then conducted a
traffic stop. R. 150:37. Mr. Setoki, who was driving the Acura, did not have his driver's
3

license with him, so Officer Dowland began gathering information from him in order to
verify that Mr. Setoki did in fact have a license. 11.150:38.
While Officer Dowland was collecting Mr. Setoki's identifying information, he
observed Mr. Setoki "reachj j over to the door handle of the vehicle." R. 150:39. Officer
Dowland also noticed that "inside the door handle was a carton of cigarettes. In between
the carton of cigarettes [w)as a small plastic baggy which [he] determined to be—which
had the appearance of methamphetamine." R. 150:39. Upon seeing the "baggy," Officer
Dowland called for backup. When his colleague arrived, Officer Dowland placed Mr.
Setoki under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. R. 150:39. He had not,
however, asked Mr. Setoki any questions about the bag or exercised any type of close
inspection over it prior to arresting Mr. Setoki. R. 150:39.
In an unclear sequence of events, Officer Dowland also stated that he saw Mr.
Setoki place the bag "in between his legs." R. 150:39. And while Mr. Setoki was exiting
the vehicle, Officer Dowland observed him place the bag in between the center console
and the driver's seat. R. 150:39-40. After he placed Mr. Setoki under arrest, Officer
Dowland retrieved the bag and he also found a glass pipe, which he thought was typically
used for "ingesting illegal narcotics." R. 150:41-42.
Although Officer Dowland had a tape recorder with him, he did not activate it
when he arrested Mr. Setoki. R. 150:42-43. After the arrest and while the tape recorder
was not activated, Officer Dowland asked Mr. Setoki several questions, none of which
focused precisely on whether the methamphetamine in the car was Mr. Setoki's. For
example. Officer Dowland asked Mr. Setoki general questions such as "how long he'd
4

been smoking methamphetamine," and where he had purchased it from. See R. 150:42.
According to Officer Dowland's testimony at trial, Mr. Scloki stated that he had only
been smoking methamphetamine for a few days and he purchased it from a friend. R.
150:42-43. Nevertheless, Officer Dowland testified that he did not find any additional
drugs on Mr. Setoki's person after he was arrested, there were no drugs located at the jail,
and Officer Dowland did not believe that Mr. Sctoki was under the influence of drugs at
the time that he was arrested. R, 150:45. Officer Dowland also testified that even
though the vehicle was registered to Mr. Setoki's father, Officer Dowland never contacted
the father during the arrest even to establish whether Mr. Sctoki had permission to use it.
R. 150:50, 53. The police also failed to fingerprint the pipe or plastic bag to determine
which individual had used it. R. 150:47.
At Mr. Setoki's trial, the aforementioned facts were admitted through Officer
Dowland's testimony. In addition, the State's crime lab investigator, Justin Bcchaver,
testified that the substance in the bag tested positive for methamphetamine. R. 150:62.
Mr. Bcchaver explained that before identifying the substance, he performed a
presumptive color test, which is not substance specific. lie also performed a
gascromatrigraph mass spectrometer test, which identified the substance as
methamphetamine. R.150:62, 67. Mr. Bcchaver did not, however, perform a second test
to clarify whether the substance was correctly identified as methamphetamine. R.
150:73. He did not recheck his results or provide the formula used to identify the
substance. R. 150:117.
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Mr. Setoki's father, Samuel Setoki, also testified at trial. He stated that he owned
the Acura that his son was driving on May 5, and that while he usually drives his son to
work, on this particular day, his son had borrowed the car. R. 150:81. He also stated that
on April 20, 2007, he was at a local Pick and Pull looking for car parts, when he found a
sunglass case and put it in his tool box. R. 150:83-84, 111. When he got home, he
looked in the sunglass case and found a baggy with a white substance in it and a small
pipe. R. 150:84. He thought he should dispose of the items but did not want to take
them into his house, so he put them in the middle console of his car. R. 150:87, 88. He
had not had a chance to dispose of the items prior to the police discovering them. R.
150:87.
At the conclusion of Mr. Setoki's father's testimony, defense counsel moved for a
directed verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence. Specifically, defense counsel
argued that there was not "any kind of physical corroborating evidence^] . . . [t]here
hasn't been retesting of the substance, there hasn't been fingerprinting, there hasn't been a
recording of the statements that are alleged to have been madef,] and there was no contact
with the registered owner." R. 150:90. The trial court denied the motion and submitted
the case to the jury, which found Mr. Setoki guilty of both counts. R. 50:122.
Mr. Setoki appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This court should reverse Mr. Setoki's convictions for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia because there was
insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Setoki had constructive possession of the illicit
6

items. More precisely, the State failed to establish that Mr. Setoki exercised control over
the items and had the intent to use them and thus, the trial court should have granted
defense counsel's motion for a directed verdict. Alternatively, the evidence was so
lacking on the constructive possession element that the trial court committed plain error
by submitting Mr. Setoki's case to the jury. Consequently, this court should reverse Mr.
Setoki's convictions.
ARGUMENT
I.

There was Insufficient Evidence to Establish that Mr. Setoki had
Constructive Possession of Drugs or Drug Paraphernalia.

This court should reverse Mr. Setoki's convictions for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia because the State
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Setoki constructively possessed
cither item. Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) explains that
[ ijt is unlawful . . . for any person knowingly and
intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog
or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting
in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2007). Additionally, Utah Code section 58-37a-5(l)
states that:
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent
to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow,
harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal,
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter.
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Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2007). Thus, to prove that Mr. Setoki is guilty of
possession of a controlled substance, the State must establish that he (1) knowingly and
intentionally, (2) possessed, (3) a controlled substance. See id. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). To
establish that he is guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia, the State must prove that
he (1) possessed, (2) with an intent to use, (3) drug paraphernalia. See id. § 58-37a-5(l).
In this case, Mr. Setoki's convictions should be overturned because the State failed to
establish that he constructively possessed a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia
because it did not demonstrate that he exercised dominion or control over the items with
the intent to use them.
A. Defendant did not Knowingly or Intentionally Possess a Controlled Substance or
Drug Paraphernalia with the Intent to Use Either Item
This court should reverse Mr. Setoki's conviction because the State failed to
establish that he knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance or drug
paraphernalia with the intent to use either one. In State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah
1985), the Utah Supreme Court explained that there are two ways in which the State can
establish that a criminal defendant possessed a controlled substance or drug
paraphernalia. The first method is to show that the defendant had actual physical
possession, i.e., that the items are on a criminal defendant's person. See id. at 318. The
second method is to demonstrate that the defendant had constructive possession. See id.
at 318-19. Constructive possession results '"where the contraband is subject to
|defendant's] dominion and control."' Id, at 319 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
8

Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981)). "Under this approach, the State must show that
'there was a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the drugs or paraphernalia to
permit a factual inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise
control over the drugs or paraphernalia.'" State v. Ferry, 2007 UT App 128, ^ 16 n.2, 163
P.3d 647 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, *\\ 15, 985 P.2d 911).
In light of this requirement it is not sufficient to establish that the defendant knew of the
drugs or paraphernalia and had access to them: "Knowledge and ability to possess do not
equal possession where there is no evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and
ability." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319; see also id. ("[Pjersons who might know of the
whereabouts of illicit drugs and who might even have access to them, but who have no
intent to obtain and use the drugs can not be convicted of possession of a controlled
substance.").
In this instance, the State argued for liability under a constructive possession
theory. However, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Setoki had
constructive possession over the methamphetamine and pipe because there was no
evidence to show that he had the intent to make use of the items. While defense counsel
preserved this issue in the trial court when she moved for a directed verdict, the trial court
also committed plain error because "the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction
of the crime charged and . . . the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the
trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." State v. Holgatc, 2000 UT 74, ^J 17,
10 P.3d 346.
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To assist courts with determining whether there was a sufficient nexus between the
defendant and the illegal items to the extent that the defendant can be said to have
constructively possessed the items, "Utah case law enumerates several 'relevant
considerations.'" Ferry, 2007 UT App 128, ^| 16 n.2 (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79 at 1|
15).

These considerations include: (1) "[ojwnership and/or
occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs are found,"
(2) "incriminating statements made by the accused," (3)
"incriminating behavior of the accused," (4) "presence of
drugs |or paraphernalia] in a specific area over which the
accused had control," and (5) "presence of drug paraphernalia
among the accused's personal effects or in a place over which
the accused has special control." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. . . . In
sum, the factual circumstances of the case must "permit the
inference that the accused intended to use the drugs as his or
her own." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319; sec also [ State v. Salas, 820
P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)] ("In order to find that
the accused was in possession of drugs found in an
automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have
sole access to, there must be other evidence to buttress such
an inference.").

Ferry, 2007 UT App 128,^1 16 n.2.
Applying these considerations to the facts of this case, it is clear that Mr. Setoki
did not constructively possess drugs or drug paraphernalia. For example, the marshaled
evidence indicates the following:
•

On the day of his arrest, Mr. Setoki was driving his father's car, R. 150:37,
80;

•

I Ie was pulled over for a potential speeding violation but never ticketed, R.
150:37;
10

•

While conducting the traffic stop, Officer Dowland observed a small plastic
bag containing a white substance, R. 150:39;

•

He then called for backup and placed Mr. Setoki under arrest, R. 150:39;

•

At an unspecified time during the stop, Officer Dowland observed Mr.
Setoki place the bag in between his legs, R. 150:39;

•

While Mr. Setoki was exiting the car, Officer Dowland observed him place
the bag between the driver's seat and the center console, R. 150:39-40;

•

After arresting Mr. Setoki, Officer Dowland asked him how long he had
been smoking methamphetamine and where he purchased it, R. 150:42-43;

•

Mr. Setoki responded that he began smoking methamphetamine a few days
ago, and he purchased it from a friend, R. 150:42-43.

Notwithstanding this evidence, however, the trial court erred in overruling defense
counsel's motion for a directed verdict because this evidence is insufficient to support a
constructive possession theory. More specifically, while Mr. Setoki had control over his
father's Acura at the time of his arrest, he did not have exclusive control over the vehicle.
At best, he used the vehicle on an occasional basis, but the car belonged to and was
actively used by his father. R. 150:80-81. Further, as Mr. Setoki's father testified at trial,
he had found the drugs at a local Pick and Pull and he put the drugs in the car. R. 150:
83-84, 87-88. While Officer Dowland was aware that Mr. Setoki was not the registered
owner of the vehicle, he never questioned Mr. Setoki about the vehicle's owner. R.
150:50. In fact, Mr. Setoki's father was not contacted at any point during the
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investigation, R. 150:85. Officer Dowland also never specifically questioned Mr. Setoki
about the bag he observed prior to arresting him, and even after Mr. Setoki's arrest,
Officer Dowland never specifically questioned him about the drugs that were found in the
car. See R. 150:42. Instead, Officer Dowland only asked him vague questions such as
"how long he'd been smoking methamphetamine" and where he purchased it from. Of.
State v. Ferry, 2007 UT App 128,1| 16, 163 P.3d 647 (stating that "aside from the
syringe's proximity, there is little to no admissible evidence indicating that Defendant
intended to exercise dominion and control, over the syringe" (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Adding further support to the fact that Mr. Setoki did not intend to use the drugs or
paraphernalia that were found in the car, Officer Dowland testified that he did not find
any additional drugs on Mr. Setoki's person after he was arrested, there were no drugs
located at the jail, and Officer Dowland did not believe that Mr. Setoki was under the
influence of drugs at the time that he was arrested. R. 150:45. Further, as defense
counsel argued at trial, the police failed to fingerprint the bag or the pipe to establish that
Mr. Setoki had in fact handled the drugs or the paraphernalia, and they failed to retest the
substance in the bag to confirm that it was actually methamphetamine. R. 47, 73. While
Mr. Setoki may have stated that he smoked methamphetamine at some point over the last
few days, he did not state that he used or was going to use the drugs that were located in
the car. This evidence, coupled with the fact that Mr. Setoki was not under the influence
at the time of his arrest, he did he have any additional drugs or paraphernalia on his
person, and his father admitted to placing the drugs in the car support the conclusion that
12

Mr. Setoki did not have constructive possession of the illicit items because he had no
intention of using them. Cf. Ferry, 2007 UT App 128, ^| 16. Because the evidence
regarding constructive possession was so lacking, the trial court erred in denying defense
counsel's motion for a directed verdict.
In the alternative, however, the trial court committed plain error by submitting this
case to the jury because the evidence was so lacking that the jury must have entertained a
reasonable doubt regarding whether Mr. Setoki committed the charged crimes. As the
Utah Supreme Court has explained, a trial court commits plain error by submitting a case
to the jury if, "after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted."' State
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, U 18, 10 P.3d 346 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212
(Utah 1993)). As previously explained, the State failed to present sufficient evidence that
Mr. Setoki constructively possessed the drugs or drug paraphernalia. Because this
evidence was so lacking, especially with respect to the constructive possession element,
this error should have been obvious to the trial court. Consequently, the trial court
plainly erred by submitting Mr. Scloki's case to the jury. Thus, this court should reverse
Mr. Setoki's convictions.
CONCLUSION
This court should reverse Mr. Setoki's conviction because the State failed to
present sufficient evidence to indicate that he had constructive possession of a controlled
13

substance or drug paraphernalia. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying defense
counsel's motion for a directed verdict. Alternatively, the trial court committed plain
error by submitting this case to the jury because the evidence was so lacking that the jury
must have entertained reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Setoki committed the charged
crimes.

SUBMITTED Ihis^Jj_ day of January, 2009.

DEBCXyVI I KATZ LEVI
Attorney for Appellant
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Tab A

UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (2007)
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts-Penalties
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony;
and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing scries of two or more violations of Title
58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in
concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree
felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (T)(a)(ii) or (iii)

may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if
the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76- 10-501 was used, carried, or
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for
a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years
and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penaltics:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit
them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third
degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part
of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor.
2

(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the
person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction
the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 6413-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect
to controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year
to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person
convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any
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measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner,
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another,
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body:
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty
of a second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-374(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
(3) Prohibited acts C-Pcnalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or,
for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent
himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian,
or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the
use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying
mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any
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drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications
under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of
those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the
grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds
which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a
school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10- 501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the
act occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or dis5

tribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of
any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony, (ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person
is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been
less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for
that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g).
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly
solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person
to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware
that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state,
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a
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bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so
with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his employment.
(10)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as
defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1 )(v), who uses, possesses, or transports pcyotc for bona
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian
religion as defined in Subsection 58- 37-2(1 )(w).
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding pcyote as defined in
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the pcyotc was used,
possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion.
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense under this Subsection (10) as soon as practicable, but not later than ten days prior
to trial.
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good
cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (10) by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to
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the charges.
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without
the invalid provision or application.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (2007)
§ 58-37a-5. Unlawful acts
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia
to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce,
process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this chapter.
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture
with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be
used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest,
inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of
this act. | FN 11 Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a person under
18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person making the delivery is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, magazine, handbill,
or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is to
promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor.

